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15 Diverging Europe: The Political
Consequences of the Crises in a Comparative
Perspective
Swen Hutter, Argyrios Altiparmakis and Guillem Vidal
15.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we describe the impact of the crises on European party
competition in a comparative perspective. That is, we summarise the
trends across the three macro-regions used as a structuring framework
in this book. While the previous chapters have offered detailed country-
based accounts of the unfolding and consequences of the economic and
political crises, the present chapter takes a bird’s-eye view of the
commonalities and dissimilarities in the content and structure of
party competition across the regions. Our quantitative study of the
big picture (measured with our original media data) is complemented
by the concluding chapter, which considers additional features of party
systems and takes a more qualitative approach (see Chapter 16).
In combination, the two chapters provide answers to our initial
research questions of whether and how the multiple crises that
Europe faced in the aftermath of the Great Recession inﬂuenced poli-
tical conﬂict in national party systems.
More speciﬁcally, in this chapter we evaluate the ideal-type scenarios
developed in Chapter 1 regarding three topics: (a) the issues that become
politicised in times of crisis; (b) the potential re-structuration of the
political spaces; and (c) the driving forces of change. The introductory
chapter highlighted one common effect of the Great Recession all over
Europe, i.e. a reinforcement of the second, non-economic, conﬂict
dimension. In times of economic hardship, we should observe not only
a simple return of economic struggles but also increasingly politicised
conﬂicts over cultural and more narrowly conceived political issues of
democratic renewal and reform. The shape of this second conﬂict dimen-
sion differs across Europe’s macro-regions, however. The differences
reﬂect the long-term transformations of the party systems in the regions
and the different crisis experiences (see Chapters 1 and 3). The previous
chapters have foreshadowed substantial cross-country variation within
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each region,1 but they have also underscored the heuristic value of our
cross-regional perspective. Taking this into account, we wish to underline
from the start that the following descriptive summaries of our results are
designed to forgo some detail with the aim of carving out the systematic
variations behind country-speciﬁc manifestations.
We proceed in three steps. In Section 15.2, we examine the level of
politicisation of the three central issue domains, i.e. economic, political
and cultural issues. In Section 15.3, we focus on how the various conﬂicts
structure the regional political spaces. Here, we also introduce a new
measure to study the association between economic and non-economic
conﬂicts. In Section 15.4, we move from the party-system level to the
party level. Based on the work of Hobolt and de Vries (2015), we produce
ameasure that indicates which party groups are driving restructuration by
adopting a strategy that sets them apart from their competitors regarding
both issue emphasis and position-taking.
15.2 Beyond the Economy: The Most Politicised Issues in the
Great Recession
Which issue domains were most politicised in the three European macro-
regions? Did Europe’s multiple crises lead to systematic changes in the
topics that became politicised? What kinds of change did they induce?
These are the central questions that we seek to answer in this section.
As we have done throughout this book, we conceptualise politicisation as
salience multiplied by polarisation. By doing this, we treat both compo-
nents of party competition as equally important and ultimately obtain
ameasure that indicates the structuring capacity of an issue domain in the
political space. If an issue is not both salient and polarised, it can hardly
structure the partisan space (for the measures, see Chapter 3).
Based on the results of the country studies, we restrict the empirical
analyses to the issue categories that most clearly indicate the various
conﬂict dimensions: economic issues cover welfare, economic liberalism,
economic reforms and conﬂicts over the euro (including bailouts); poli-
tical issues cover democratic renewal, democratic reform and European
integration; and cultural issues (or what we have labelled ‘new’ cultural
issues) cover cultural liberalism, immigration and nationalism. Note that
as a result of the ﬁndings of the country chapter, we include Ireland in the
1 Most importantly, not only the extent and type of a crisis (economic and/or political)
but also the pre-existing conﬂict structures, the timing of elections and contingent
strategies of political parties play a crucial role in explaining the variation observed
(as was highlighted in the heuristic framework developed in Chapter 1. See
Figure 1.1 for a summary).
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group of southern European countries. We have opted for this solution
given the extent of the economic crisis, the absence of a New Right
challenger and the emerging divide over austerity in the country (for
details, see Chapter 14). We have also cross-checked our results by re-
assigning Ireland to the NWE countries. However, this does not affect
any of the main regional conclusions.
Cross-regional Variation
To analyse the politicisation measure, we proceed in two steps. First, we
present descriptive evidence on the politicisation of the three issue
domains by region and period (pre-crisis versus crisis). Afterwards, we
present the results of simple OLS regressions with the level of politicisa-
tion as our dependent variable.2 To begin with, Table 15.1 shows the
average levels of politicisation in the pre-crisis and crisis periods.
The analysis covers ﬁfty-eight election campaigns: twenty-six campaigns
in the years from 2001 to 2008 (coded as the ‘pre-crisis period’) and
thirty-two in the years from 2009 to 2016 (coded as the ‘crisis period’).
Overall, the average values for the pre-crisis period empirically illus-
trate our claim in the introductory chapter: both economic and cultural
issues were fairly politicised in all three regions in the 2000s, whereas
more narrowly deﬁned political issues only structured conﬂict in SE and
CEE. In other words, we observe moderately politicised struggles over
economic and cultural issues in NWE in the pre-crisis years, whereas all
three issue categories (economic, cultural and political) gave rise to
moderately politicised struggles in SE and CEE before the onset of the
Great Recession. It is important to note that struggles centring around
domestic corruption and bad governance drove these cross-regional dif-
ferences, while questions related to the deepening andwidening of the EU
did not structure political conﬂict in either SE or CEE. Although we
observe more politicised struggles over Europe in NWE before the
Great Recession, the average values are also fairly low. This ﬁnding
mirrors previous results on the politicisation of Europe, which also show
a decline in the 2000s compared to the 1990s (see Grande and Hutter
2016).
A comparison of the pre-crisis baseline with the ‘crisis elections’ sug-
gests that the substantive focus of political conﬂict diverged even more
across the three European macro-regions after the onset of the Great
2 Note that we have standardised the politicisation measure across issues, countries and
elections because it would otherwise have very small values, and some outliers may have
distorted the results (but the overall results and regression analyses are not affected by this
decision).
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Recession. The crisis period saw increasingly politicised conﬂicts over
economic and cultural issues in NWE, over economic and political issues
in SE, and over political and cultural issues in CEE (see Table 15.1).
To begin with, the pattern for NWE indicates the impact of the economic
crisis, as we observe somewhat more contestation related to economic
issues. At the same time, an increase in the structuring capacity of cultural
issues points to a reinforcement of the long-term trends in this region.
The results in Table 15.1, by contrast, indicate the most pronounced
‘crisis effects’ in the south of Europe. Economic issues in SE saw by far the
strongest increase in politicisation from the pre-crisis to the crisis period
(plus 0.28). This increase is due to combined conﬂicts over domestic and
European austerity (as indicated by the rise of the ‘euro including bail-
outs’ category from a non-issue to a highly politicised issue in SE). While
not as pronounced, the regional averages also highlight that questions of
democratic renewal and reform were increasingly structuring political
conﬂict in SE. The impact of an (accelerating) political crisis can also
be observed in the four CEE countries, with increasingly politicised
struggles over political issues.3 By contrast, economic issues became
even less politicised while the increase in cultural issues reﬂects long-
term trends in the region.
As stated before, we also ran simple ﬁxed-effect regressions with the
level of politicisation per issue category (i.e. economic, political and
cultural) in a campaign as our dependent variable. Here, our unit of
analysis is the election campaign (ﬁfty-eight cases multiplied by three
issue domains, which results in a total of 174 issue/election cases), and
the independent variables are the region, the type of issue domain and
a dummy variable for the crisis (post-2008). Figure 15.1 shows the
predicted probabilities of a three-way interaction between crisis, region
and type of issue domain. With this analysis, we can further support the
previous ﬁndings, although we do not ﬁnd the expected level of statistical
signiﬁcance for all the cases. According to the results shown in the ﬁgure,
economic issues became signiﬁcantly more politicised in the crisis elec-
tions in NWE and SE, whereas there were no signiﬁcant changes in the
case of CEE. The magnitude of the effect was signiﬁcantly larger in SE,
where the economic crisis was most felt. Cultural issues lost weight in the
3 Again, note that the cross-regional variation for political issues is exclusively driven by
conﬂicts over domestic issues, which are almost 10 times more politicised in SE and CEE
than in NWE. By contrast, we observe some convergence, although at a low level,
regarding the politicisation of Europe. Questions of the further deepening of Europe
became slightly less politicised in NWE but more so in the other two regions. Note
again that here we exclude questions related to the euro and bailouts, which are covered
by the ‘economic issues’ category.
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public debate in SE after the crisis, particularly those concerning cultural
liberalism. By contrast, the predicted probabilities suggest increasing
struggles over such issues in NWE and CEE (although the results are
statistically non-signiﬁcant, which is a tough threshold given the small
number of cases). The same applies to political issues, where we only
observe a slight decline in the ﬁrst crisis elections for NWE. Although the
coefﬁcients are as expected (positive) for both SE and CEE, the increase
from pre-crisis to within-crisis does not reach statistical signiﬁcance
either.
Cross-country Variation
The country chapters and the size of the standard errors in the previous
regression analysis indicate that Europe’s crises were differently
Economic
Political
Cultural
Economic
Political
Cultural
Economic
Political
Cultural
North-western Europe
Southern Europe
Central-eastern Europe
0 .2 .4 .6
Pre−crisis
Within−crisis
Figure 15.1 Predicted probabilities of the level of politicisation by
region, issue domain and period
Note: Standard Errors Clustered by Country-election. C.I. levels
84.4 percent (i.e. if C.I. do not overlap it means that there is a signiﬁcant
change at α = 0.05).
334 Swen Hutter, Argyrios Altiparmakis and Guillem Vidal
articulated not only across but also within the three macro-regions.
To further elaborate on the question of cross-versus within-regional
variation, Figure 15.2 shows the politicisation levels in the crisis period
for each country separately.
To begin with, the results for all six countries from NWE conﬁrm
a subsidiary role of conﬂicts related to political issues – i.e. to institutional
reforms and the ﬁght against corruption – in this part of Europe (see
Figure 15.2). Moreover, economic issues were fairly politicised across
NWE in the crisis (at least much more than in the four cases from CEE).
However, it is in Austria where we observe themost intense struggles over
economic issues during the crisis, followed by the Netherlands and
Switzerland. As cultural issues were also highly politicised in the
Netherlands and Switzerland, the two countries are most characteristic
of the overall regional pattern of intense conﬂicts over both economic and
cultural concerns (see the top right-hand graph in Figure 15.2).4
By contrast, Germany and the UK are placed in the opposite quadrant
with below-average politicisation levels for both economic and cultural
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Figure 15.2 The levels of politicisation by issue domain and country in
the crisis period
Note: The ﬁgure shows the average level of politicisation by issue
domain and country in the crisis period (years 2009 to 2016). Countries
from north-western Europe are highlighted with hollow circles,
countries from southern Europe (incl. Ireland) with black circles and
countries from central-eastern Europe with grey circles.
4 In Switzerland, the high value for cultural issues is mainly driven by struggles over
immigration, whereas we observe similar politicisation levels for immigration and cultural
liberalism in the Netherlands. The relative contributions of the two cultural sub-issues
reﬂect the timing of the elections, because the Swiss campaign in autumn 2015 was the
only campaign in the northwest covered by our analysis that took place amidst the ﬁrst
peak of the refugee crisis (for details, see Chapter 12).
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issues. Although the longitudinal analysis inChapter 13 indicated that the
two somewhat caught up with the developments in countries where the
New Right had already been established long before the crisis, our com-
parative analysis still indicates clear-cut differences. Finally, France and
Austria show yet twomore patterns. In Austria, economic issues trumped
cultural issues in the crisis, whereas we observe the opposite in France.
All the southern European countries (plus Ireland) show below-
average values for the politicisation of cultural issues (again, see
Figure 15.2). After the onset of theGreat Recession, we no longer observe
visible and polarised conﬂicts over cultural liberalism, while immigration
was already almost invisible in the pre-crisis campaigns covered by our
data. Based on the combined politicisation measure, Greece, Portugal
and Spain ﬁt the general southern European story the best. All three
countries saw politicised conﬂicts over both political and economic issues
during the Great Recession.5 Italy is the ‘odd man out’, as politicisation
mainly occurred around political issues in general and the legacy of
Berlusconi more speciﬁcally. Economic issues ﬁgured visibly in the
2013 Italian campaign too, but we only observe limited polarisation
(Chapter 6). Finally, based on the aggregate politicisation measures,
Ireland does not ﬁt the southern European story well. While the increas-
ing struggles over austerity might indicate some change in the highly
unstructured Irish party system (Chapter 14), the cross-national compar-
ison still indicates a low structuring capacity of all three issue domains.
Compared to NWE and SE, the countries from CEE share yet another
feature: a low level of politicisation of economic issues. All four countries
show values that are less than half the average value of 0.29 (again, see
Figure 15.2). This supports our hunch that party competition in the
region is mainly focused on non-economic issues. However, the degree
to which political and cultural issues were politicised tends to vary cross-
nationally. As is indicated in Figure 15.2, Poland is the country where
both cultural and political issues led to politicised struggles in the crisis
period. By contrast, the crisis elections saw above-average levels of poli-
ticisation for either only political (Hungary and Romania) or only cultural
(Latvia) issues. The almost exclusive attention to political issues conﬁrms
our expectations for Romania (Chapter 10). The values for Hungary and
Latvia, by contrast, reﬂect the fact that our politicisation measures only
reach high values when both features – salience and polarisation – were
5 Our indicator of political issues does not consider regionalism. We refrain from including
it as the country chapters have highlighted strong differences in the aggregated issues and
emphasised their varying links to what we refer to as a political crisis or a ‘crisis of
representation’. However, if we consider them, the values for the Spanish case increase
considerably (see Chapter 3).
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present. Thus, in Latvia, political issues were almost as salient as cultural
ones, but the ﬁght against corruption and the oligarchs only structured
the ‘Latvian-speaking’ part of the party system, and the positions taken by
the various party groups were often not as clear-cut as expected. It is with
regard to nationalism and the status of the country’s Russian-speaking
population that the Latvian parties’ positions diverge the most
(Chapter 11). This ﬁnding contrasts with the situation in Hungary,
where political issues were high on the agenda after the 2006 scandal
and led to highly polarised struggles too. Interestingly, cultural issues
were salient in both the Hungarian ‘crisis campaigns’, but especially in
2014 they were not polarised. As shown in Chapter 8, in the 2014
campaign the Hungarian parties tended to outbid each other in terms of
which was truly nationalist.
15.3 The Structure of the Political Space
in the Great Recession
Here, we proceed in two steps to assess how the different issues structured
the political spaces and whether we observe signiﬁcant changes in the
crisis period. First, we present the results of our weighted multi-
dimensional scaling procedure (WMDS) by region and period (pre-
crisis and crisis). In a second step, we focus on the alignment of conﬂicts
over economic and non-economic issues in the political spaces of the
three regions.
Comparing the Regional Political Spaces before and during
the Crisis
The regional MDS plots synthesise an enormous amount of information
and are the most parsimonious representation of party competition in
each region we can think of. While the optimal solutions in each case are
two-dimensional (as indicated by the corresponding stress values and
scree plots), we have added two additional lines to illustrate our inter-
pretation.More speciﬁcally, we have rotated the ﬁgures in such a way that
the horizontal dimension corresponds to the traditional socioeconomic
dimension of party competition, ranging from the left (pro-welfare and
anti-austerity position) to the right (pro-economic liberalism and auster-
ity position). We have also added a second dimension which usually
covers the major non-economic issues. Furthermore, we have indicated
major clusters of actors with dashed elliptical ﬁgures. The reader should
also bear in mind that the MDS method focuses on the main lines of
opposition. Secondary issues/actors are less accurately represented and
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are often moved to the periphery of the space. Issues that account for less
than 2 percent of the observations and parties with fewer than thirty
observations have been excluded from the analysis (for details, see
Chapter 2).
To begin with, Figure 15.3 shows the integrated political space for
NWE. Overall, the graphs conﬁrm the view of a limited impact of the
crises, which mainly resulted in a further strengthening of the cultural
integration–demarcation dimension. The overall structure regarding
issue locations and party clusters did not much change between the
pre-crisis and the crisis periods. However, the party conﬁgurations
became even more distinct. More speciﬁcally, in both periods the
space is characterised by two dimensions: a horizontal economic
dimension and a vertical cultural dimension. The latter opposes cul-
tural liberalism and anti-immigration. European integration – which
covers general European issues of deepening and widening – is
embedded in this dimension, as its closeness to ‘cultural liberalism’
suggests. In the crisis years, we can also ﬁnd ‘euro’ – which covers
statements regarding the common European currency and bailouts of
eurozone member states – in the graph. These issues were not salient
enough in the pre-crisis years (below 2 percent); within the crisis,
welfare ecolib
ecorefdemnew
europe
euro
cultlib
antiimmig
security
defence
edu
env
infra övp
spö
fpö
gr
bzö
stronachlib
cons
lab
lib
ukip
snp
gr
ump
psf
lib
fn
rl gr
union
spd
libgr
rl
cda
pvda
vvd
pvv
d66gr
rl
svp
lib
sps
cvp
gr
glib
0 .2 .4
crisis
welfare ecolibecoref
demnew
europecultlib
antiimmig
security
defence
edu
env
infraövp
spö
fpö
gr
bzö
lib
listmar
cons
lab
lib
ump
psf lib
pcf
fn
rl
gr
union
spd
lib
grrl
cda
pvda
vvd
pvv
gr
rl svp
lib
sps
cvp
rr
gr
rl
glib
0 .2 .4
Austria
Britain
France
Germany
Netherlands
Switzerland
pre-crisis
Figure 15.3 The structure of the north-western European political
space: pre-crisis and crisis
Note: countries are weighted equally.
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support for the euro and the bailout conditionality is located on the
right-hand side of the economic dimension in NWE.
Within the two-dimensional space, we identify three distinct party
clusters in the pre-crisis period. On the upper left-hand side of the
graph is the uniﬁed left, composed of the mainstream left-wing parties
but also of most of the radical left and Green parties. To its right, we ﬁnd
a centrist camp composed of most of the liberal parties and also some
Christian Democrats and the French UMP. Finally, the nationalist-
conservative camp is composed of the New Right parties and also the
British Conservatives and the German and Dutch Christian Democrats.
The MDS graph for the crisis period shows an even more uniﬁed left
camp on one side and a more fragmented political right. The right can
now be sub-divided into three distinct clusters. At the bottom, we ﬁnd
a homogenous cluster of all the populist right parties. They are even closer
to anti-immigration and are the most opposed to cultural liberalism and
Europe, which reﬂects the New Right’s predominant focus on cultural
issues, as does its almost equal distance to welfare and economic liberal-
ism. The other two clusters on the right are formed by a more conserva-
tive camp (composed of the Christian Democrats, the Dutch and Swiss
liberals, and the French UMP) and a more liberal camp (composed of all
the other liberal parties and the Austrian BZÖ andTeamStronach). Note
that the liberal camp includes the Dutch PvdA, which suggests that the
‘third way’ social democrats in the Netherlands went unusually far in the
direction of economic liberalism and budgetary rigour. However, all in
all, the emergence of these four camps underlines the reinforced role of
the cultural dimension in structuring party competition in NWE.
Figure 15.4 shows the structure of the political space in SE in the
elections in the mid-2000s and after the onset of the Great Recession
in 2008. Like the politicisation indicators, the graphs indicate that we
witness a period of profound transformation of the party systems in
SE. The political space changes regarding both the key structuring
issues and the main party clusters. In the pre-crisis period, we ﬁnd
essentially the same two dimensions as in NWE: an economic and
a new cultural dimension (here the opposition is between cultural
liberalism and pro-defence, because immigration is hardly salient at
all). However, in SE the economic and cultural conﬂicts are closely
aligned with each other, which contrasts with the more orthogonal
structure in the north-west. Reﬂecting the bipolar type of competition,
we ﬁnd a left-wing cluster (composed of the moderate and radical left)
opposed to the major right-wing parties. The former combines eco-
nomically left-wing positions with culturally libertarian positions,
while the latter support more conservative cultural positions and
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economically more liberal ones. The third cluster is occupied by the
Irish right-wing parties, which take centrist positions on most issues,
and by the Portuguese Socialists, who were in government in the pre-
crisis elections we cover.
The crisis does not change the dimensional character of the joint south-
ern European political space (see Figure 15.4). However, what does change
is the orientation of the second dimension and its interpretation. It is no
longer a ‘cultural’ dimension but a ‘political/European’ dimension (indica-
tive of the political crisis in the south of Europe). Cultural liberalism is
much less important in structuring the space, as is indicated by its very
peripheral location, and the issues ‘anti-immigration’ and ‘defence’ are not
even represented given their low salience (below 2 percent). By contrast,
both the economic (euro) and political (Europe) European issues have
become contested topics. As shown in the respective country chapters,
this result mirrors above all the Greek conﬁguration (see Chapter 5).
Support for both European issues is associated with the centre-right and
the centre-left. Moreover, we ﬁnd an alignment of conﬂicts over austerity
with those over democratic renewal. Importantly, this integration is driven
by a radical/New Left cluster at the bottom-left of the graph (amongst
others, Syriza, Podemos, and M5S belong to this cluster). This New Left
cluster is opposed to a centre-left one (including PASOK, the Italian PD,
the Spanish and Portuguese Socialists, and the Irish Labour Party) and
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Figure 15.4 The structure of the southern European political space: pre-
crisis and crisis
Note: countries are weighted equally.
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a centre-right one (including the Greek Nea Dimokratia, the Irish Fine
Gael, the Spanish and Portuguese Conservatives, and the Italian Scelta
Civica founded by Mario Monti).6 The centre-right is situated closer to
economic liberalism and further away from cultural liberalism than the
centre-left. Thus, while the crisis saw further splits on the political right
in NWE, it was the left that was split in the south. However, note that the
four New Right challengers in the graph are also either located close to the
left-wing cluster (the two Greek parties LAOS and ANEL) or somewhat
peripherally at the bottom of the graph (the Greek Golden Dawn and the
Italian Lega Nord, which is located there because of its regionalist agenda).
Figure 15.5 presents the results of the MDS procedure for the four CEE
countries under scrutiny. The structure of the joint political space comes
closer to that observed in NWE than to that in SE. We can identify two
somewhat independent dimensions: an economic dimension (indicated by
the solid line between welfare and economic liberalism) and a cultural
dimension (indicated by the line between cultural liberalism and national-
ism). The parties are more divided along the cultural dimension than along
the economic dimension. In the pre-crisis elections, the second pole of the
cultural dimension was associated with positive mentions of nationalism
and opposition to ethnic minorities. This contrasts with the northwest,
where this second pole is associated with anti-immigration (given the low
salience of immigration, the issue is not represented in the pre-crisis space
for CEE). Thus, as expected, a defensive kind of nationalism, which was
mobilised without the targets of nationalism in NWE, contributed to the
structuring of party competition in CEE. Importantly, the parties in CEE
cluster at least as much according to their national origins as according to
their afﬁliation with certain party families. In the pre-crisis period, we
observe a nationalist cluster (including the Hungarian Fidesz, the Polish
PiS, LPR and PSL, and also the Latvian ‘For Fatherland and Freedom/
LNNK’ and the Greater Romania Party, PRM). However, to the right of
the nationalist camp we also observe a miscellaneous cluster which involves
the Polish PO and SLD, the Hungarian MDF and almost all the Latvian
parties. At the top of the space, we ﬁnd the two Hungarian left-wing parties
(MSZP and SZDSZ) and all the Romanian parties (apart from PRM).
The space for CEE during the crisis period indicates that the cultural
dimension became even more important in structuring the political space
(reﬂecting the results for the levels of politicisation). The parties seem
ever more differentiated along the divide between cultural liberalism on
6 Berlusconi’s PDL and the Portuguese Social Democrats are also located more closely to
the centre-right than to the centre-left cluster. However, they are located further away
from Europe and the euro than the rest of the centre-right.
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the one side and nationalism on the other. Note that anti-immigration
and Europe are now also located in the ﬁgure, given their increasing
salience. Anti-immigration is now associated with nationalism and the
conservative right, while Europe is located closer to cultural liberalism (as
is democratic renewal). When we look at the location of the different
parties in the political space, we see that the differentiation along the
cultural dimension is most clear-cut in the cases of Hungary and Poland.
The less structured Latvian and Romanian party systems ﬁt less well into
the graph and cluster much more in terms of national origins. At the
bottom there is the nationalist camp with its most prominent members
being Fidesz (now joined by its more radical competitor Jobbik) and PiS
(now joined by the New Right challenger Kukiz’15). Moreover, we ﬁnd
almost all the Romanian parties in this cluster except the Save Romania
Union (USR), the new anti-corruption challenger, which emerged in
2016. The Polish opposition to the national-conservative cluster is
located closer to cultural liberalism and anti-corruption (most impor-
tantly, we ﬁnd PO here and also the left-wing SLD and ZLEW), while
the two Hungarian left-wing parties (MSZP and SZDSZ) are located
more peripherally at the top of the cultural dimension. Finally, the
Latvian parties are located between these clusters and mainly
spread along the ethnic-cultural dimension. The main party of the
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Figure 15.5 The structure of the central-eastern European political
space: pre-crisis and crisis
Note: countries weighted equally.
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Russian-speaking minority (Harmony) is located at the top of the space,
while the main Latvian-speaking parties (the Nationalist Alliance, NA,
and the Union of Greens and Farmers, ZZS) are located close to the
nationalist camp. Overall, the two graphs underline the increasing
structuring capacity of cultural and political issues in CEE.
However, they also show the often campaign-speciﬁc shifting alliances
around political issues (Romania being the most telling example of
these dynamics).
Alignments of Economic and Non-economic Conﬂicts
In a next step, we present a more formal way of studying the align-
ment of economic and non-economic conﬂicts in the political spaces
of the three regions. To do this, we focus on the location of the three
issues that most clearly represent the critical challenges to the estab-
lished structure of political conﬂict in each region: the anti-
immigration discourse in NWE, the defensive nationalist discourse
in CEE and the democratic renewal discourse in SE. We are inter-
ested in whether our MDS procedure shows any alignments of the
conﬂicts over these three issues with the traditional economic
left–right dimension. More speciﬁcally, we study whether the Great
Recession led to a closer integration of the three issues with econom-
ically left-wing positions.
For the analysis, we construct a measure of the spatial integration of an
issue on the economic left–right dimension. The measure considers the
distances in the political spaces between (a) the respective issue category
(e.g. anti-immigration) and ‘welfare’ (the supposed left-wing pole of the
economic dimension) and (b) the distance between the respective issue
and ‘economic liberalism’ (the supposed right-wing pole of the dimen-
sion). More speciﬁcally, we calculate the ratio between these two dis-
tances. That is, we divide the distance to economic liberalism by the
distance to welfare.We rely on this relativemeasure because the distances
in an MDS graph can only be interpreted relative to each other.
Moreover, we calculate the natural log (ln) of the division. Our indicator
then corresponds to the log-odds of these two distances. The log has the
advantage that it takes a value of 0 if the particular issue is located at equal
distance from both poles. Positive values indicate an alignment with
welfare (the economic left) and negative values an alignment with eco-
nomic liberalism (the economic right). Note that values above 0.7 indi-
cate that the issue is at least twice as close to welfare as it is to economic
liberalism, and values below -0.7 indicate the exact opposite.
We calculate the measure for the regional MDS graphs shown in the
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previous section and for the single election graphs shown in the country
chapters.
Table 15.2a shows the results for the location of the ‘anti-immigration’
issue category in the political spaces in NWE. The low values resulting
from the regional MDS highlight that conﬂicts over immigration do not
align with conﬂicts over economic issues. If at all, the small negative value
in the pre-crisis period indicates that anti-immigration tended to be
located closer to economic liberalism. The values for the individual
countries underline this interpretation, as we ﬁnd some right-wing asso-
ciation of anti-immigration in the Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany
and France in the pre-crisis period. Austria is the only country where we
observe a small tendency towards a left-wing association in the pre-crisis
period (see also Chapter 12). However, the value of 0.24 still points to an
orthogonal structure. Moreover, we ﬁnd only weak evidence that anti-
immigration was more closely integrated with left-wing economic posi-
tions in the Great Recession. While we observe some shifts to the left in
theNetherlands, France andGermany (as indicated by the positive values
for the changes), Austria shows the opposite pattern; Switzerland and the
UK show hardly any change at all. Overall, this leads to a situation in
which the conﬂicts over the main new cultural issue are even less aligned
with the economic left–right dimension. Switzerland and Austria are the
only countries that still show a somewhat closer association of anti-
immigration demands with economically right-wing positions (for related
trends, see also Afonso and Rennwald forthcoming).
The values for the south of Europe (including Ireland) highlight
the close alignment of economic and non-economic conﬂict in the
region (see Table 15.2b). That is, calls for democratic renewal and
institutional reforms are mainly associated with left-wing positions.
Moreover, it is important to note that such calls were already closely
associated with the left-wing pole of the economic dimension before
the Great Recession. The values for the pre-crisis period range from
0.84 in Ireland up to 1.75 in Spain. The regional plots in Figure 15.4
indicate minor changes (-0.25), but we observe a pronounced shift to
the right in Italy (-1.49), followed by Spain (-0.48) and Greece
(-0.38). As the values in Table 15.2b show, the Italian 2013 cam-
paign is the only one where we observe even a slightly negative value
of -0.5, indicating that democratic renewal was located somewhat
closer to economic liberalism than welfare. As the Italian chapter
highlights, this has much to do with the fact that the central conﬂict
revolved around narrowly deﬁned political issues in general and
Berlusconi’s legacy more speciﬁcally. Moreover, it underlines that
the challenger in Italy, Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S), was much less
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clearly embedded in the political left than the challengers in the
other SE countries (for details, see Chapter 6). Overall, the Greek,
Spanish and Portuguese cases still show a quite clear left-wing asso-
ciation with democratic renewal in the crisis. However, the slight
Table 15.2 Alignments of economic and non-economic conﬂicts in the political
space (log odds)
a) The location of ‘anti-immigration’ in NWE
pre-crisis crisis change (shift to the left)
Regional MDS (Figure 15.3) −0.23 −0.08 0.15
Austria 0.24 −0.78 -1.03
UK −0.06 0.13 0.18
France −0.73 0.05 0.78
Germany −0.93 −0.16 0.77
Switzerland −1.32 −0.95 0.37
Netherlands −1.37 −0.04 1.33
b) The location of ‘democratic renewal’ in SE
pre-crisis crisis change (shift to the left)
Regional MDS (Figure 15.4) 2.34 2.10 −0.24
Spain 1.75 1.27 −0.48
Greece 1.30 0.92 −0.38
Portugal 1.18 1.27 0.10
Italy 0.99 −0.50 -1.49
Ireland 0.84 1.07 0.23
c) The location of ‘nationalism’ in CEE
pre-crisis crisis change (shift to the left)
Regional MDS (Figure 15.5) 1.16 0.54 −0.62
Hungary 0.90 1.25 0.35
Latvia 1.00 0.40 −0.60
Poland 1.90 1.10 −0.80
Romania - 0.40 -
Note: The measure of association is 0 if the respective issue is located equally distant from
welfare and economic liberalism as the supposed end points of the economic dimension in
the political spaces. Positive values indicate left-wing integration (closer to welfare) and
negative values right-wing integration (closer to economic liberalism). Values above 0.7 or
below -0.7 are highlighted in bold. The table shows the averages values for the elections in
the pre-crisis and crisis periods. Due to its low salience (below 2 percent), ‘nationalism’was
not included in the pre-crisis space of Romania (see Chapter 10).
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shift to the right in the crisis might well be related to a strengthening
of new challengers on the centre-right (most importantly,
Ciudadanos in Spain) and the radical right (most importantly,
ANEL in Greece). In addition, a more detailed look at single cam-
paigns shows that the left-wing integration is stronger in cases when
the mainstream left was in opposition (the most telling examples are
Portugal and Spain in 2015).
The results in Table 15.2c show that the defensive nationalism on
the rise in CEE was associated with the left-wing pole of the economic
dimension during both periods (pre-crisis and crisis). As the regional
MDS graphs already indicated, this association of the demarcation pole
of the cultural dimension with economically left-wing positions differs
from the functional equivalent in NWE – which, as we have just shown,
is either not aligned with economic conﬂicts or is instead associated
with economically right-wing positions. However, note that none of the
party systems are very polarised on economic questions. The joint
regional plot suggests that the integration of ‘nationalism’ with the
left became less pronounced during the crisis (-0.62). However,
a detailed look at the four countries highlights that changes in Latvia
and Poland mainly drive this ﬁnding. By contrast, in Hungary nation-
alism became even slightly more integrated with the left-wing pole of
the economic dimension during the crisis. Ultimately, these diverging
trends led to there being two groups of countries in the crisis period: (i)
Hungary and Poland, where we observe a stronger association of
nationalism with the left-wing pole; and (ii) Latvia and Romania,7
where conﬂicts over economic issues and nationalism were less aligned
with each other.
To sum up, the results show that, ﬁrst, the main cultural or
political challenges in the three regions were to different degrees
aligned with economic struggles. In simple terms, we observe the
most substantial alignment in the south and the weakest in the north-
west, with CEE being somewhat between the two extremes. Second,
calls for democratic renewal tended to be associated with the left-
wing pole of the economic dimension in SE, as were nationalist
claims in CEE. By contrast, anti-immigration statements tended to
be more associated with the political right in the NWE pre-crisis
period. Third, the trends over time suggest an increasing indepen-
dence of the different types of conﬂict in all three regions. Thus, the
7 In Romania, nationalism was less salient, but it emerged as a more polarising issue in the
two ‘crisis’ elections in 2012 and 2016 (see Chapter 10).
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Great Recession did not lead to a further alignment of economic and
non-economic conﬂicts.
15.4 Which Parties Are the Driving Forces of Change?
Zooming in to the party level allows us to explore the characteristics
of the agents which brought forward system-level changes in politici-
sation. This allows us to assess the ideal type scenarios with respect
to the agents of change in times of crisis. To reiterate, we expected
that there would be a continued increase in the politicisation of
cultural issues spearheaded by parties from the New Right in NWE.
In SE, we expected that changes in politicisation would be driven by
New Left parties, which mostly politicise economic and political
issues. In contrast, in CEE we assumed that mainstream parties
rather than challengers would be in the vanguard of politicising
mostly cultural and political issues.
To empirically describe these patterns, we need to measure who
politicises which issue and in what direction. To do this, we follow
Hobolt and de Vries (2015) by combining a party’s issue emphasis
with its issue position. Speciﬁcally, for each party in each election, we
multiply its salience score by the distance between its position and the
mean position of all the parties in the system (the interested reader
can ﬁnd more details of the measurement in Chapter 2). While
Hobolt and de Vries use this indicator to measure issue entrepreneur-
ship, we consider it to be a measure of the party’s visible attempt to
politicise an issue. This is why we call it party-level politicisation.
In our view, the measure combines salience and radicalness (the
distance of the party’s position from the system mean), which corre-
spond to the two components of the politicisation concept that we
apply at the system level.
Note, however, that this measure has a direction, as the distance
from the mean position of all the parties in the system may be
negative or positive. We code the positions in such a way that
positive values indicate the most important expected ‘challenges’ to
the status quo. Thus, positive values for economic issues denote
a tendency towards state interventionism; for political issues a call
for more democracy and transparency; for cultural issues a challenge
to libertarian, pro-immigration and anti-nationalism stances; and for
European issues a stance of Euroscepticism. The category ‘Europe’
is shown separately, as constructing an average position on political
issues (domestic and European) would distort underlying
differences.
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For the empirical analysis, we run a series of ﬁxed-effect regres-
sions with party-level politicisation per party group and issue domain
as our dependent variable. Our primary independent variables are
region, crisis period (as at the systemic level) and party type. More
precisely, we categorise the parties in terms of two cross-cutting
distinctions: left versus right and challenger versus mainstream.
We base these distinctions on already existing classiﬁcations of
party families. That is, we deﬁne as challengers from the left parties
of the radical left, the Greens and Movimento Cinque Stelle (M5S).8
The challengers from the right are all the radical right parties.
Juxtaposed to them, we deﬁne all the social-democratic/socialist par-
ties as mainstream left and all the conservative, liberal, centrist and
Christian-Democratic parties as mainstream right. Apart from these
more ideological classiﬁcations (which reﬂect our ‘structuralist’
approach to party competition), in the following regression analyses
we control for more strategic factors, such as government participa-
tion and vote share.
Figure 15.6 presents the predicted probabilities of the party-level poli-
ticisation measure for each issue domain, region and party type.
The results for the economic issues highlight the different party conﬁg-
urations in the three regions. In southern Europe, the mainstream left
occupies a middle ground between the mainstream right and challengers
from the left. This is important as it shows that, although the centre-left
had to implement the austerity measures (because it was in power), in the
election campaigns it did not move all the way to the centre-right but
remained more to the left than its centre-right competitors. At the same
time, the distinct values for the challengers from the left highlight their
role in politicising economic issues in SE. This result contrasts with
NWE, where we observe a signiﬁcant left–right divide on economic
issues, irrespective of parties’ mainstream or challenger status. In CEE,
we observe no signiﬁcant differences regarding economic issues.
Challengers from the left holdmore outsider positions, but this difference
is not statistically signiﬁcant (in general, the results for leftist challengers
in CEE should be interpreted cautiously, given the scarcity of
observations).
The ﬁndings for cultural issues show the crucial role of challengers
from the right in politicising them in all three regions. Challengers from
the right adopt a conservative nationalist position in all three regions,
8 We realise this is a controversial choice, and, as we shall see, it may skew our results
somewhat. However, additional robustness checks indicate that our main interpretations
are not affected by this choice.
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although the patterns of opposition aremost clear-cut forNWE. InNWE,
we also observe a signiﬁcant difference between both party types from the
left –mainstream and challengers – and the mainstream right, which very
much represents their average position in their respective party systems.
Regarding the principal agents who politicise political issues, our
results at the party level show that no party group politicised these ques-
tions in NWE. In SE and CEE, by contrast, we do observe a certain
division between challenger and mainstream parties: challenger parties
tended to be more supportive of democratic renewal and reforms.
However, these differences are only statistically signiﬁcant when we con-
sider the contrast between the challengers from the left and the main-
stream right in SE. As expected, the challengers from the left in southern
Europe were the most homogeneous group calling for democratic
renewal (as indicated by the small standard errors). Nonetheless, our
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results suggest that conﬂicts over (domestic) political issues seemedmuch
less prone to lead to stable divisions between mainstream and challenger
parties than ones over cultural or economic issues. In SE, the position of
the mainstream left is revealing. As suggested in Section 15.3, the main-
stream left in opposition attempted to rejuvenate itself by promoting
democratic renewal and also reform. Thus, it adopted similar politicisa-
tion strategies as the challengers from the left, which ultimately resulted in
a non-signiﬁcant difference between the two types of parties. For CEE,
the results for the political issues support our general hunch that main-
stream and challenger parties do not occupy distinct and stable positions
on most issues.
The limited explanatory power of the challenger/mainstream divide
in CEE is also visible in the case of European integration. Figure 15.6
shows that the difference between challengers from the right and all
the other party types in CEE is statistically signiﬁcant, but the size of
the coefﬁcient is small, reﬂecting the status of Europe as a topic which
is not very politicised in CEE. By contrast, in NWE, we ﬁnd the
expected much more distinctive Eurosceptic voice of the challengers
from the right, while in SE challengers from the left took on this role.
The results mirror the distinct locations of the issue of European
integration in the regional political spaces, and they underline that
European integration was politicised with different meanings in the
south and the northwest of Europe.
We also have an interest in discovering how the crisis affected the
way the different party types politicised a given issue. For this pur-
pose, Figure 15.7 shows the predicted probabilities for each party
type and region again, but this time it compares party-level politicisa-
tion before and within the crisis. Overall, the ﬁgure reveals a pattern
of continuity. On most issues, our media-based CSA data suggest
that the various party types did not change their mobilisation strategy
signiﬁcantly or even at all in the crisis. The most notable differences
are: (a) an increased politicisation of cultural issues by challenger
right-wing parties in NWE; and (b) an increased politicisation of
economic issues by challenger left-wing parties in SE. In addition,
we observe a statistically signiﬁcant shift towards a more pro-market
position by the mainstream right and a more Eurosceptic position of
the challengers from the left in SE. However, when we zoom in to
the national level, this second result is almost entirely due to a few
extreme cases (most importantly, the Greek Communist Party).
Finally, we should note the relative stability and homogeneity of
party-level politicisation in CEE throughout the crisis. What is dis-
tinctive about this region is that the challenger parties were not
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adopting politicisation strategies that were much different from the
mainstream ones, supporting our idea that the mainstream parties
successfully occupied niches that belonged to challengers in other
parts of Europe.
15.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have complemented the detailed country case studies
with a cross-regional comparison of how the multiple crises that the
European democracies faced in the aftermath of the Great Recession
affected the content and structuration of party competition.
First, we analysed the issues that became politicised (i.e. that domi-
nated and polarised the public debate) before and after the onset of the
Great Recession. In broad strokes, our cross-regional ﬁndings point to
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increasingly diverging patterns across the three regions. As expected, the
only common, but counter-intuitive, trend is that cultural or political
issues became more important in structuring political conﬂict in all
three regions. By contrast, economic conﬂicts were mainly boosted in
the south and, to some extent, also in the north-west, while they were
relegated to the background in central and eastern Europe. In north-
western Europe, the Great Recession triggered an acceleration of the
region’s long-term transformation, i.e. an increasing politicisation of
cultural issues (in particular, immigration). This is not what we observe
in southern Europe, where the Great Recession was a much more critical
juncture. The combined economic and political crises politicised ques-
tions about the best economic policy solutions to cope with the crisis and
about the need for democratic renewal and reforms. Conﬂicts over cul-
tural issues (in particular, cultural liberalism) structured conﬂict in south-
ern Europe in the pre-crisis years, but they almost disappeared from the
electoral campaigns during the crisis. Finally, we observe the least change
regarding the issues politicised in central and eastern Europe. Although
the countries under scrutiny (except Poland) were hard-hit by the eco-
nomic crisis, the structuring conﬂicts centred ever more around more
narrowly conceived political issues and/or cultural issues.
Second, we assessed how the various structuring conﬂicts shaped the
regional political spaces. The empirical results indicate that the struc-
ture of the space in north-west Europe did not change. As in earlier
studies (Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012), we still observe two fairly indepen-
dent dimensions: an economic left–right dimension and a cultural
integration–demarcation one. However, our new ﬁndings suggest
a further differentiation of the party clusters along the cultural dimen-
sion. While the political left in north-western Europe seemed ever more
homogeneous in its combination of an integrationist position (pro-
Europe and multiculturalism) with economically left-wing positions,
the political right seemed ever more split between culturally more
integrationist and more nationalist stances. Again, the analysis for
southern Europe shows a much more profound transformation. While
the political space remained essentially one-dimensional in the crisis,
the issues embedded and the party clusters changed. In the early/mid-
2000s, cultural and economic issues were embedded in the major
divide, essentially splitting the radical and mainstream left against the
mainstream right. During the crisis, we observe that political and
economic issues are key to understanding the structure of conﬂict.
Moreover, the political left was very much split between the main-
stream and an ever-stronger New Left/radical cluster. The results for
Central and Eastern Europe also highlight the importance of non-
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economic issues. However, in contrast to the north-west of Europe, the
dominant cultural divide instead emerged between supporters and
opponents of a nationalist-conservative programme. At the same time,
the clustering of parties suggests some caution regarding over-strong
claims about a common regional space, as we observe many more
country- than ideology-based clusters.
Third, we shifted to the party level to identify the driving forces of the
restructuration of conﬂict. Once again, our results indicate that challen-
gers from the right were driving the cultural conﬂicts in north-western
Europe. Overall, our data do not point to a general shift in the program-
matic appeal of the radical populist right to the left on economic issues.
Instead, we observe an even more radical insistence on their anti-
immigration agenda. In southern Europe, the radical/New Left is the
main driving force of conﬂict over economic and political conﬂicts.
Again, the crisis did not change the pattern much, but it boosted the
visibility of this party type. Interestingly, we barely ﬁnd the same division
of labour between the mainstream and challenger parties in central and
eastern Europe. There, we often ﬁnd a rather non-differentiated pro-
grammatic offer – or that parts of the so-called mainstream (like Fidesz
in Hungary and PiS in Poland) are the actual drivers of the ongoing
restructuration of cultural conﬂicts.
Our results point to important commonalities of the countries within
a given region that are worth stressing. Most importantly, we show that
certain issue domains were little politicised in all the countries in a region
during the crisis: political issues in north-western Europe, cultural issues
in southern Europe and economic issues in central-eastern Europe.
Except for central and eastern Europe and Ireland in the pre-crisis period,
the joint regional political spaces show coherent ideological party clusters
that also point to commonalities across national political systems.
The same holds true for the similar types of driving forces that we
identiﬁed in the last part of our analysis.
Nonetheless, we also observe interesting deviations from the general
regional story. Our results suggest that the four north-western European
countries where the populist radical right had established itself long
before the crisis (i.e. Austria, France, the Netherlands and Switzerland)
still showed a more pronounced pattern of change as compared to
Germany and the UK. For the UK, this might reﬂect the fact that we
focus on inter-party competition, while many of the fault lines often lead
to signiﬁcant intra-party conﬂicts – European integration being the most
telling example (see, e.g., Lynch 2015). In Germany, the 2017 election
constituted a more critical test case for our thesis than the developments
up to 2013 covered in our volume.
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Deviations from the regional story are also important in southern
Europe. Ireland and Italy ﬁt the general regional story the least.
We placed Ireland in this group of countries because of the strength of
the economic crisis and the emerging austerity divide observed in the
country chapter. However, from a comparative perspective, the Irish case
still showsmuch lower levels of politicisation and structuration in general.
At the same time, the absence of an emerging cultural divide also sets
Ireland apart from the pattern in north-western Europe. Italian politics,
by contrast, lacks the increasing politicisation of economic issues and the
substantial alignment of opposition to both ‘old politics’ and ‘austerity’
that we observed in Greece, Portugal and Spain.
Lastly, in central and eastern Europe, we found the most pronounced
country differences, which, at least for Romania, also have much to do
with election-speciﬁc alliances and issues. Overall, the other three coun-
tries show a more clear-cut emergence of a cultural divide, although the
Hungarian and Polish paths showmore similarities given that the Latvian
case is very much dominated by the divide between the Russian-speaking
minority and the Latvian-speaking majority.
The next and ﬁnal chapter summarises these country-speciﬁc manifes-
tations in more detail, and it also focuses more on how the various crises
unfolded over time.
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